Employee Threshold on Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes: A Matter of the Merits by O\u27Brien, Christine Neylon & Greene, Stephanie
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 95 | Issue 2 Article 4
2006
Employee Threshold on Federal
Antidiscrimination Statutes: A Matter of the Merits
Christine Neylon O'Brien
Boston College
Stephanie Greene
Boston College
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
O'Brien, Christine Neylon and Greene, Stephanie (2006) "Employee Threshold on Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes: A Matter of
the Merits," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 95 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol95/iss2/4
ESSAYS
Employee Threshold on Federal Antidiscrimination
Statutes: A Matter of the Merits
Christine Neylon O'Brien' & Stephanie Greene'
I. INTRODUCTION
T wo weeks after receiving a verdict in the amount of $40,000 in a sexual
harassment case brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
Jenifer Arbaugh saw that verdict vacated when the defendant's motion to
dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was granted.' The
defendant employer claimed that it was not an "employer" as defined in
Title VII because it had fewer than the required fifteen employees. 4 The
district court granted the motion, holding that Title VII's fifteen-employee
threshold is a jurisdictional requirement that can be raised at any time.
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, and Arbaugh petitioned the
Supreme Court for relief.5
In Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation, the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the number of employees required for an employer to be
covered by federal antidiscrimination statutes is a jurisdictional matter or
a question that speaks to the merits of the claim.' The United States cir-
cuit courts of appeals were split on whether employee-numerosity require-
ments should impact federal subject-matter jurisdiction or whether they
i Professor of Business Law, Boston College. B.A., Boston College, 1975; J.D., Boston
College Law School, 1978.
2 Associate Professor of Business Law, Boston College. B.A., Princeton University, 198o,;
J.D., Boston College Law School, 1984.
3 See FED. R. Civ. P. iz(h)( 3). The Rule states, "Whenever it appears by suggestion of
the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action." Id.
4 Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe(b)
(2oo6).
5 See generally Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2006).
6 The Supreme Court resolved the question in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235
(zoo6), a case that arose from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 380 E3 d 219 (5th Cir.
2004).
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are merely elements going to the merits of a Title VII claim.7 In reviewing
this issue, the Supreme Court held that the employee-numerosity thresh-
old is an element of a plaintiff's claim, not an issue that determines federal
court subject-matter jurisdiction.
8
The Court's decision has important implications for litigants. How the
employee-threshold requirement is characterized may be critical to the
outcome of a case, as it was for Jenifer Arbaugh. If the issue is character-
ized as jurisdictional, questions or objections may be raised at any time,
by a party or a judge, and may result in dismissal for lack of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction even after a court has entered a verdict for a plaintiff. As a
jurisdictional issue, a judge would decide the question rather than a jury.
By contrast, characterizing the number of employees as an element going
to the merits of a case would require a defendant to move to dismiss for
failure to state a claim before or during trial. 9
The facts and history of the Arbaugh case reveal that the characteriza-
tion of the employee-numerosity issue involves questions of fairness and
judicial efficiency. Arbaugh litigated her case, received a verdict in her fa-
vor, only to see the verdict vacated when the defendant belatedly raised
the paucity of employees as a basis of a motion for summary judgment.1
To avoid this seemingly unfair and inefficient result, a judge should raise
the subject-matter jurisdiction issue on her own.11 In fact, at oral argument,
Justice Kennedy questioned whether a judge should raise the issue of the
number of employees on his own initiative or "just has to watch the case
sail over the waterfall."" Characterizing the employee-numerosity require-
ment as one that goes to the merits of the case, as the United States Su-
preme Court did in Arbaugh,3 requires the defendant employer to raise the
question at the outset; otherwise, the defendant is deemed to have waived
this defense to liability.
The problem of distinguishing jurisdictional claims from claims that go
to the merits of a case also raises fairness and efficiency issues when state
law claims are presented along with federal claims, as they were in Arbaugh.
Dismissing the case for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction requires
pendent state claims to be "chucked out"'4 because they are not properly
7 See discussion infra Part II.
8 Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1238-39.
9 See FED. R. Civ. P. iz(b)(6), 12(h)(2). Rule I2(h)(2) states: "A defense of failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted ... may be made in any pleading... or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits." Id.
io Arbaugh, iz6 S. Ct. at 1238.
ii See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Aferits, 8o WASH. L. REv. 643, 657 (2005).
12 Transcript of Oral Argument at i i, Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. 1235 (No. 04-944) (Kennedy, J.,
commenting).
13 See discussion infra Part III.
14 Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. 1235 (No. 04-944) (Scalia, J.,
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before the court. While some of these claims would be dismissed without
prejudice, the plaintiff would be obliged to start litigation afresh in state
court in order to have an opportunity for recovery, an unwelcome burden in
terms of time and expense.
This Essay examines the Arbaugh case, its holding, and implications.
Part II sets forth the two approaches from the federal circuit courts of ap-
peals. Part III analyzes the facts and issues involved in the Arbaugh case and
assesses the merits of the Supreme Court's decision. Part IV discusses the
immediate effect that the Supreme Court's decision has had on subsequent
cases.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Prior to the Court's decision in Arbaugh, scholars and the federal courts of
appeals were divided on the appropriate characterization of the employee-
numerosity question."5 The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, as well
as the District of Columbia Circuit, held that the employee-numerosity
requirement is a matter of the merits.16 The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits held that the requirements for employer and
employees are jurisdictional. 7
The circuits that treated the employer and employee definitions as ju-
risdictional did so with little analysis or discussion, merely stating that the
issue is jurisdictional without offering any rationale. 8 The facts and proce-
commenting).
15 See Wasserman, supra note Ii, at 703 (advocating characterization of the question
as one of the merits of a cause of action); Stefania A. DiTrolio, Comment, Undermining and
Unintwining: The Rightto a Jury TrialandRule 12(b)(f), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1247 (2003) (dis-
cussing that whether a defendant is an "employer" as defined by Title VII is not purely a juris-
dictional fact for the court to decide; where intertwined with the merits of the case, it should be
for a jury to decide); Jeffrey A. Mandell, Comment, The Procedural Posture of Minimum Employee
Thresholds in Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 72 U. CH. L. REV. 1047, 1076 (2005) (arguing
that the issue is properly characterized as jurisdictional); Susan J. McGolrick, Supreme Court
Rules Employee Threshold in Title VII Does Not Determine Jurisdiction, 36 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
at AA-i (Feb. 23, 2006) (noting that prior to the Arbaugh decision "federal appeals courts were
split on whether employee-numerosity requirements were jurisdictional or not").
16 See Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 76-83 (3d Cir. 2003); Da Silva v.
Kinsho Int'l, 229 F3d 358, 366 (2d Cir. zooo); Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 E3d 676,
677 (7th Cit. 1998); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 1 17 F3d 621, 623-25 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
17 See Hukill v. Auto Care, Inc., 192 E3d 437, 444 (4th Cir. 1999); Scarfo v. Ginsberg,
175 E3d 957, 960 (i ith Cit. 1999); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1335 (6th Cir. 1983),
overrledinpartbyArbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235 (zoo6); Childs v. Local 18, IBEW,
719 F2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983); Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir.
198o), overruled in part by Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 1z6 S. Ct. 1235 (2oo6); Owens v. Rush, 636
E2d 283, 287 (ioth Cir. I98O).
18 See, e.g., Scarfo, 175 E3d at 961 (assuming, without explaining, that the determination
of whether a defendant is an "'employer' within the definition of Title VII is a threshold juris-
2oo6-2oo7]
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dure in Hukillv. Auto Care, Inc.19 were similar to those in the Arbaugh case.
In Hukill, the plaintiff employee had prevailed on a claim under the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and received an award from a jury. Post
trial, the defendants sought to vacate the judgment and have the case dis-
missed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the defendant
was not an employer within the meaning of the FMLA because it did not
have at least fifty employees as required by the Act."0 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit stated that "a district court lacks subject-matter ju-
risdiction over an FMLA claim if the defendant is not an employer as that
term is defined in the FMLA."'
Courts that rejected the jurisdictional approach to the employee-thresh-
old issue emphasized that the federal courts have jurisdiction, provided a
claim is non-frivolous and arises under federal law. 2 Judicial administration
reasons further supported characterizing the numerosity requirement as an
element of a claim rather than a jurisdictional requirement. In Sharpe v.
Jefferson Distributing, the court stated, "[slurely, the number of employees is
not the sort of question a court (including appellate court) must raise on its
own, which a 'jurisdictional' characterization would entail."2 3 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed, stating:
[holding the requirement to be jurisdictional] would require a federal court
to determine whether a company had fifteen employees during the rele-
vant period, even if the parties so stipulated. To require a federal court to
engage in such a fact-intensive inquiry sua sponte-which might in some
cases require a federal appellate court to dig through an extensive record,
including pay stubs and time sheets-appears to be a waste of scarce judi-
cial resources .... 24
dictional issue"); Childs, 719 E2d at 1382 (dismissing Title VII claim because plaintiff did not
present evidence that defendant had at least fifteen employees); Owens, 636 Ezd at 287 ("It
is true that Congress maintained a 15-employee limitation in Title VII, and that this limita-
tion is jurisdictional."). But see Nesbit, 347 E3d at 76-83 (suggesting and then rejecting several
plausible arguments, including a commerce clause argument and statements on jurisdiction in
other Supreme Court cases, for making the fifteen-employee requirement jurisdictional).
19 See generally Hukill, 192 E3d 437.
20 See id. at 438.
21 Id. at441.
22 SeePapa v. Katy Indus., 166 E3d 937,939-40(7th Cir. 1999); Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib.
Co., 148 F3d 676, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1998); accord EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117
F3d 6z, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Because the [ADA] claim arises under the laws of the United
States and is neither 'immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction' nor
'wholly insubstantial and frivolous,' the district court has federal-question jurisdiction pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.") (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)).
23 Sharpe, 148 E3d at 677-78.
24 Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 E3d 72, 83 (3d Cit. 2003).
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The court stated that it doubted "Congress intended such a result. '2 5
In Da Silva v. Kinsho International,16 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit identified three important purposes for which the distinction be-
tween jurisdiction and merits must be clarified.
First is the obligation of a court, on its own motion, to inquire as to subject
matter jurisdiction and satisfy itself that such jurisdiction exists. Second is
a federal court's authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . over
claims not within federal jurisdiction, a power available only as to claims
that properly invoke the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, a judg-
ment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is subject to
collateral attack as void .... 27
In the Da Silva case, the court found that "the institutional require-
ments of a judicial system weigh in favor of narrowing the number of facts
or circumstances that determine subject-matter jurisdiction.""8 The court
was concerned with the adjudication of pendent state claims as well as the
obligation on the court to make its own determination regarding subject-
matter jurisdiction.9
III. FACTS AND JUDICIAL HISTORY IN ARBAUGH V. Y&H CORP.
A. Federal District Court
In 2000-2001, Jenifer Arbaugh worked as a bartender-waitress at the
Moonlight Caf6, incorporated in the State of Louisiana under the name Y
& H Corporation after its two officers, directors, and shareholders, Yalcin
Hatipoglu and Hassan Khaleghi.3 ° Arbaugh asserted that she was forced
to resign in February 2001 because of a hostile work environment created
by Yalcin Hatipoglu. In the trial before a magistrate judge at the district
court level, the jury awarded her $40,000 in damages.31 Shortly after that
award, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of subject-
25 Id.
26 Da Silva v. Kinsho Int'l, 229 F3d 358 (2d Cir. 2000).
27 Id. at 361-62.
z8 Id. at 365 (citing Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The
Legitimacy of lnstitutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200 (1984)).
29 Id.
30 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., No.01-3376, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5568, at *2-3 (E.D. La.
Apr. 2, 2003). Yalcin Hatipoglu was a listed defendant in the plaintiff's action for sexual harass-
ment under Title VII as well as the subchapter S corporation, Y & H. The wives of Yalcin and
Hassan were also shareholders.
31 Id. The damages included $5,000 for backpay, $5,000 compensatory, and $30,000 in
punitives. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 380 F3d 219, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2004).
2006-2007]
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matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). 32 The
defendant's motion was converted to a motion for summary judgment un-
der Rule 56 and the motion was granted.33 The district court noted that the
plaintiff bore the burden of showing that there was subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. Following post-trial discovery, the court focused its decision on facts
determining whether certain individuals qualified as employees within the
meaning of Title VII.34 Finding that the individuals in question did not
qualify as employees, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue
of material fact and that the defendant employer was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
35
B. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court, finding that the defendant's "failure to qualify as an 'employer'
under Title VII deprives a district court of subject-matter jurisdiction."36
The appellate court concluded that the trial court properly followed prece-
dent within the circuit regarding the characterization of the question about
the number of employees in a Title VII case. 37 The court recognized that
several federal circuit courts of appeals characterized the employee-numer-
osity issue as one going to the merits of the case. Nevertheless, the Fifth
Circuit was bound by its precedent that the issue was jurisdictional.
38
The Fifth Circuit had addressed the precise issue raised in Arbaugh
in several cases. In Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon,39 Womble v. Bhangu,40 and
Greenlees v. Eidenmuller Enterprises,41 the court found that in a case involv-
ing a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff's failure to establish that the defen-
dant had fifteen or more employees deprived the court of subject-matter
jurisdiction.4" Viewing the issue as jurisdictional, the appellate court ex-
32 Arbaugh, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5568, at *i.
33 Id. at *.
34 See infra note 42.
35 Arbaugh, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5568, at *1l, *29.
36 Arbaugh, 380 E3d at 224 (citing Dumas v. Mt.Vernon, 612 F.2d 974 ,980 (5th Cir. 198o),
overruled in part by Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2006)).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 224-25.
39 Dumas, 612 F2d 974.
40 Womble v. Bhangu, 864 F.zd 1212 (5th Cir. 1989).
41 Greenlees v. Eidenmuller Enters., 32 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1994).
42 In these cases, however, as in other circuits taking the jurisdictional approach, the
court merely assumed that employee-numerosity was a question of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion without offering any justification for its conclusion. See Greenlees, 32 F3d at 198 (stating
that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Title VII claim if the defendant did not
meet the definition of employer); Womble, 864 E2d at 1 213 ("If Bhangu did not meet the statu-
tory definition of 'employer,' then the court did lack subject matter jurisdiction over him.");
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amined the trial court's reasoning in determining that the employer did
not have the required fifteen employees.43 The appellate court agreed with
the lower court's conclusion that the employer did not have at least fifteen
employees during the relevant time period and thus affirmed the motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
44
C. Decision of the United States Supreme Court
On February 22, 2006, the Court issued a unanimous opinion written by
Justice Ginsburg.4" The Court recognized that "whether a disputed matter
concerns jurisdiction or the merits (or occasionally both) is sometimes a
Dumas, 612 F.2d at 980 (concluding that the dismissal of a Title VII claim for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction was proper where the defendant lacked employer status). See discussion
supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
In Arbaugh, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that Clark v. Tarrant County, Texas,
798 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1986), should apply. Arbaugh, 380 E3d at 224. In Clark, the court held that
"[w]here ... questions concerning subject matter jurisdiction are intertwined with the merits,
the court should not dismiss [a Title VII claim] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction unless
the claim is frivolous or clearly excluded by prior law." Clark, 798 F.d at 739. In Arbaugh, the
appellate court held that because the issue was first addressed in Dumas, that precedent was
binding, and to the extent that Clark conflicted with the precedent established in Dumas,
Clark must be viewed as non-binding. Arbaugh, 380 F3d at 224-25. Other circuits taking the
jurisdictional approach to the employee-numerosity issue also struggled with the question of
jurisdictional issues being intertwined with the merits of the case and concluded that such
mixed cases should be decided on the merits. See Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104
F3d 1256, 1258 (1 ith Cir. 1997); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F2d 257, 259 (loth Cir. 1987).
43 Arbaugh, 380 F3d at 23o. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that the
lower court used an economic realities test to assess the employment status of several indi-
viduals. The Fifth Circuit had adopted and followed a hybrid economic realities/common law
control test from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Spirides v. Reinhardt,
613 F2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Use of the test in the Fifth Circuit was well-settled. See, e.g.,
Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 Fad ii58, 1 16o (5th Cir. 1986); Mares v. Marsh, 777 Fad
io66, IO67-68 (5th Cir. 1985). Subsequent to the time when the federal district court decided
Arbaugh, the United States Supreme Court decided Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, PC.
v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003). In Clackamas, the United States Supreme Court adopted a six-fac-
tor test advanced by the EEOC to determine whether a director/shareholder is an employee.
Id. at 449-5o.The factors are: whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set
the rules and regulations of the individual's work; whether and, if so, to what extent the orga-
nization supervises the individual's work; whether the individual reports to someone higher
in the organization; whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the
organization; whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed
in written agreements or contracts; whether the individual shares in profits, losses, and liabili-
ties of the organization. Id. In Arbaugh, the court found that the trial court's conclusion on the
status of various individuals as employees would have been the same if the factors adopted by
the Supreme Court in Clackamas were used. Arbaugh, 380 E3d at 230.
44 Arbaugh, 380 E3d at 23 1.
45 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2oo6). Justice Samuel Alito replaced Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor after the oral arguments took place, but neither participated in the
Arbaugh decision. See McGolrick, infra note 90.
2006-2007]
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close question."' The Court concluded, however, that "the threshold num-
ber of employees for application of Title VII is an element of a plaintiff's
claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue."'"
The Court noted that in approaching the question of whether the em-
ployee-numerosity issue is jurisdictional or an element of the merits, it
needed to be cautious about its use of the word "jurisdiction," because
courts had frequently used the term too loosely.4" Noting that cases are
sometimes dismissed "for lack of jurisdiction" without regard to whether
federal subject-matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim was at issue,
the Court referred to such instances as "'drive-by jurisdictional rulings,'
that should be accorded 'no precedential effect' on the question whether
the federal court had authority to adjudicate the claim in suit."49
The Court recognized Congress's intent to grant broad subject-matter
jurisdiction to the federal courts over issues involving Title VII and that
federal courts have jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."50 Furthermore, the Court
stated that Congress's intent to provide a federal forum for Title VII claims
is strengthened by Title VII's specific jurisdictional provision, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(3).5 '
Against this background, the Court provided three reasons to support its
conclusion that the employee-numerosity issue is not jurisdictional. First,
the Court stated that "subject-matter jurisdiction, because it rests on the
court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.""2 If the em-
ployee-numerosity issue is characterized as jurisdictional, the courts would
be required to raise the issue on their own initiative. This requirement,
according to the Court, is not supported by the text of Title VII.5 3 Second,
because an employee-numerosity issue often turns on contested facts, the
Court saw the question as an element for the jury to decide rather than the
judge. 4 Finally, the Court reasoned that dismissing a case for want of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction based on the number of employees would unduly
interfere with pendent state claims that had been fully tried to a jury.5"
These three points, according to the Court, support a conclusion that the
46 Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at i245 (citing Da Silva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp., 229 F3 d 358, 361
(2d Cir. zooo)).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1242.
49 Id. at 1242-43 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91
(1998)).
50 Id. at i239 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1244 (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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employee-numerosity issue must be treated as an element of a claim and
not as a subject-matter jurisdictional prerequisite unless Congress amends
Title VII to indicate otherwise.1
6
IV. ThE FEDERAL COURTS APPLY ARBAIGH
Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Arbaugh, numerous courts
have discussed and applied the decision in employment discrimination and
other contexts. A survey of the first wave of subsequent federal court de-
cisions indicates that Arbaugh will have a broad impact because the cases
relate to all areas of federal court jurisdiction. The Court's bold pronounce-
ment in Arbaugh-that statutory definitions and provisions are not issues of
subject-matter jurisdiction unless characterized as such by Congress-has
necessitated that the lower federal courts announce their own realignment
of the issues where their past precedent is in conflict with the Supreme
Court's current bright-line rule. Following the Court's warning in Arbaugh
about "drive-by jurisdictional rulings," courts must proceed with new
awareness when employing the term "jurisdictional."
The federal courts have the power to decide if they have jurisdiction
pursuant to a constitutional or congressional grant. Once a federal court as-
sumes jurisdiction in a case, it will determine if the requisite elements of
cause(s) of action are established, and consequently, whether the plaintiff's
case has merit. Where a defect has not been classified by Congress as one
of subject-matter jurisdiction, the courts must deal with the issue as one of
the merits of the claim until such time as Congress decides to change the
classification. Procedurally, where the matter is not jurisdictional, the courts
must convert a defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction to another appropriate motion, such as one for summary judg-
ment, thus disposing of the case on its merits. In contrast, where an issue is
one of subject-matter jurisdiction, the courts are obliged to raise the ques-
tion even if the parties do not, and to deal with the question at any time,
even after a decision on the merits has been reached.
A. Securities Laws and the Extraterritorial Reach of RICO
The range of cases affected by Arbaugh is evident from a brief review of
recent federal cases. In Partington v. American International Specialty Lines
Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined the
impact of Arbaugh in a case alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933
and various state law claims.57 As the Fourth Circuit noted, the Supreme
Court in Arbaugh "clarified the distinction between the requirements for
56 Id. at 1245.
57 Partington v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 443 F 3 d 334 (4 th Cir. 2oo6).
2oo6-2oo7]
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federal subject matter jurisdiction and the elements of a federal claim of
relief.""s In light of the previous "lack of clarity" in the case law regarding
this distinction, the Court in Arbaugh felt called upon to establish a "'read-
ily administrable bright line' to resolve future confusion." 9 The Partington
Court applied the bright line from Arbaugh to permit plaintiff Partington's
individual verdict against the defendant Charterhouse and its insurers to
stand because the federal district court had federal-question jurisdiction
and jurisdiction under the Securities Act of 1933.60 This was so even though
Partington had not purchased the securities for himself and the language in
the 1933 Act referred to a "person purchasing. ' 61 The Fourth Circuit found
that Congress did not intend to make this language a jurisdictional limita-
tion on the federal courts' power to hear 1933 Act claims. 6 Because of the
absence of a clear intent to restrict or limit jurisdiction of the federal courts
through this provision, the court concluded that the "plaintiff's purchase
[is] an ingredient of the claim for relief."6 Since the provision was an ele-
ment of the case, rather than a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction, it was
too late for the defendants or the court to raise it.
In Ayyash v. Bank AI-Madina, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York was faced with various motions to dismiss.
The defendants were all Lebanese nationals employed by banks that the
plaintiff alleged defrauded him of money in violation of, inter alia, the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' One such
motion, brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
related to the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under RICO in light of
the limited extraterritorial reach of the statute.6' The plaintiff relied upon
the "conduct" test to establish jurisdiction, namely that the conduct ma-
terial to the completion of the fraud, and that directly caused the injury,
occurred in the United States.66 The district court noted that the Supreme
Court's decision in Arbaugh "may require that the Court of Appeals review
its treatment of the question of RICO's extraterritorial effect" because Ar-
baugh presumes that a limitation on coverage is "nonjurisdictional" unless
58 Id. at 339.
59 Id. (quoting Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1245).
60 Partington, 443 F3d at 339-40. Partington obtained a default judgment against the
appellants. Id. at 339.
61 Id. at 340 (citing Arbaugh, iz6 S. Ct. at 1245 n. ii).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 339.
64 Ayyash v. Bank Al-Madina, No. 04 Civ. 92oi(GEL), 2006 WL 587342 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
9, zoo6).
65 Id. at *1, *4 (citing North-South Fin. Corp. v. AI-Turki, 10o F3d 1046, 1052 (2d Cir.
1996)).
66 Id. (quoting AI-Turki, 100 E3d at 1052).
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Congress characterizes it as jurisdictional. 67 In the past, the Second Cir-
cuit had characterized the limits on RICO's extraterritorial application as
a constraint on a court's subject-matter jurisdiction. 6 The district court in
Ayyash noted the significant consequences that result from labeling an issue
jurisdictional, as detailed in Arbaugh. Specifically, the court noted that the
issue cannot be waived, can be raised at any time even after trial, and that
factual disputes regarding jurisdictional matters are frequently resolved by
judges prior to trial.
69
B. Labor and Employment Cases
1. Procedural Implications of "Employer" Status.-Several cases involving al-
legations of labor or employment discrimination have also discussed the
impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Arbaugh. A case from the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Minardv. ITCDeltacom,7 ° extensively quot-
ed the Supreme Court's decision in Arbaugh.7" This was due, perhaps in
part, to the fact that Arbaugh arose from the same circuit, but also to the fact
that the cases have significant similarities. Minard involved the definition of
"eligible employee" under another equal employment opportunity statute,
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). 2 The statute "entitles
[such] eligible employees to take up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave an-
nually for any of several reasons including a serious health condition that
makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position."7 3 An
"employer" under the statute is "engaged in commerce or in any industry
or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees."74
The plaintiff Minard requested FMLA leave "to undergo surgery to
treat a serious medical condition."'" She received a memorandum that stat-
ed she was an "eligible employee," that she had a right to the leave, and
67 Ayyash, 2oo6 WL 587342, at *4 n.2 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235,
1245 (2006)).
68 Id. (quoting A1-Turki, 100 E3d at lO51).
69 Id. (quoting Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1243-45). The district court in Ayyash denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss and permitted discovery to proceed, but limited to jurisdic-
tional issues. Ayyash, 2006 WL 587342, at *8.
70 Minard v. ITC Deltacom, 447 F3d 352 (5th Cir. 2oo6).
71 See id. at 353, 355-57 (quotingArbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1235, 1238, 1245).
72 29 U.S.C. § 26o (2006).
73 Afinard, 447 F3d at 353 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(I)(d)).
74 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 261 1(4 )(i)). The definition of employer applies if the employer
has fifty employees or more "for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar work-
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." Id. Excluded from "eligible employee" is
"any employee who is employed at a worksite at which or within 75 miles of which, the em-
ployer employs less than 50 employees." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C § 261 1(2)(b)(ii)).
75 Id. at 354.
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that the leave "would be counted against her annual FMLA entitlement."76
When Minard sought to return to work as entitled under the statute, the
defendant employer terminated her because he had discovered that she
was not eligible under the Act at the time she requested the leave." This
was so because she worked at a field sales office and the company em-
ployed less than fifty employees at or within seventy-five miles of her
worksite.78 Minard filed suit under the FMLA, and amended her complaint
to include that the employer was equitably estopped from denying that she
was an eligible employee because she had relied to her detriment upon the
employer's representation that she was covered by the protections of the
statute.
79
The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment, finding that the defendant was not an "employer" and that the
FMLA and the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not apply.8 0 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted the district court's
ruling as a determination that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
because Minard was not an eligible employee."1 Reviewing the matter de
novo, the Fifth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Ar-
baugh.82 There, the court noted, the numerical qualification or threshold
in Title VII's definition of "employer" did not "circumscribe federal court
subject-matter jurisdiction."8 13 Rather, "the employee-numerosity require-
ment relates to the substantive adequacy of Arbaugh's Title VII claim."
' 4
The Arbaugh Court established a bright-line rule that statutory threshold
limitations on coverage will not affect subject-matter jurisdiction explicitly
required by Congress."
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Minardconcluded that the
definition section of FMLA, which defines thirteen terms and contains the
fifty employee threshold, is similarly "a substantive ingredient of a plain-
tiff's claim for relief, not a jurisdictional limitation. '"86 The court noted that
the definition section did not explicitly make these elements jurisdictional,
that it was separate from the jurisdictional section, and that the Supreme
Court in Arbaugh explicitly abrogated previous circuit court decisions find-
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
8o Id. at 354-55.
81 Id. at 355.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 355-56 (citing Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1238).
84 Id. at 356 (citing Arbaugh, i26 S. Ct. at 1238-39).
85 Id. (citing Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1245).
86 Id.
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ing such employee-numerosity requirements to be jurisdictional.87 In ad-
dition to Arbaugh, the Minard court noted another post-Arbaugh case where
the Eleventh Circuit applied Arbaugh's bright-line rule that the employee-
numerosity requirement in Title VII is an element of the merits rather than
one of subject-matter jurisdiction.8"
With respect to the plaintiff's equitable estoppel argument, the appel-
late court concluded that the employer "unintentionally made a definite
misrepresentation to Ms. Minard that she was an 'eligible employee' under
FMLA at the time she requested leave; that she reasonably relied upon
that misrepresentation in taking leave," and thus the case was remanded
to the trial court to determine whether the plaintiff had medical alterna-
tives to surgery.89 This was a material issue of fact relevant to whether she
relied to her detriment upon the employer's misrepresentation in deciding
to take the leave.
The Minard decision illustrates the direct impact of Arbaugh upon cas-
es that involve employee-threshold requirements under other equal em-
ployment opportunity statutes. Rather than allowing dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff was allowed her day in court to
prove that she had a FMLA claim. In Minard, unlike Arbaugh, the defen-
dant timely raised the employee-threshold defense at the pleadings stage.
However, the fact that the defendant explicitly misrepresented that Ms.
Minard was qualified at the time she decided to take the leave allows her
to assert that the employer should be equitably estopped from denying her
eligibility. The Fifth Circuit remanded to give the plaintiff an opportunity
to provide factual documentation that she had other treatment options that
she could and would have pursued in order to avoid the leave and retain
her position, had she been correctly informed that she was not eligible for
the leave. 9°
Two cases from Texas involving challenges to "employer" status, as in
Arbaugh, further illustrate the procedural and tactical implications of the
Supreme Court's decision. In Simons v. Harrison Waldrop & Uhereck, LLP,
the defendant moved to dismiss an Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) case, arguing that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
because the plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant was an "employer" under the ADEA. 1 The district court noted
87 Id. at 357.
88 Id. (citing Faulkner v. Woods Transp., Inc., 174 F. App'x 525 (1 ith Cir. 2006)).
89 Id. at 359.
90 Id. See also Susan J. McGolrick, FMLA, Fifth Circuit Holds 5o-Employee Threshold for
FMLA Coverage Not a Jurisdictional Limit, 76 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at AA-i (Apr. 20, 2oo6)
(noting that Fifth Circuit reinstated Melissa Minard's FMLA claim and "held that she may
proceed with her equitable estoppel claim based on the company's representation to her be-
fore she underwent surgery that she was eligible to take FMLA leave").
9! Simons v. Harrison Waldrop & Uhereck, LLP, No. Civ.A. V-o5-71, 2006 WL 763619
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that in light of Arbaugh, employee-numerosity requirements are not a limi-
tation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts; rather, they are "a substantive
ingredient of a ... claim for relief."9 The district court explicitly extended
the Supreme Court's conclusion regarding Title VII to the ADEA and also
noted that plaintiff's pleadings were sufficient to establish this element
for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.93 It is interesting to note that the
plaintiff's affidavit asserted that the defendant employed twenty or more
employees, including partners, in order to meet the employee-numerosity
threshold under the ADEA. 4 The plaintiff still may encounter significant
barriers to establishing that the defendant is an "employer," because of her
inclusion of partners in the employee count.95 The second decision, King v.
Enterprise Leasing Co. of DFW, also involved denial of a 12(b)(1) motion.' In
King, the district court responded to the defendant's motion that because
it was not the plaintiff's "employer" under Title VII and other federal and
state statutes, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.97 The court de-
nied the 12(b)(1) motion in light of Arbaugh since it perceived the "em-
ployer" issue in King as analogous to that in Arbaugh.98 Again in King, as in
Simons, once the defendant's motion fell under Rule 12(b)(6), the court was
required to accept well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint as true,
and the plaintiff survived that motion.99
2. Procedural Implications of Arbaugh in Wage and Hour Cases.-In another
labor case, Fernandez v. CenterplateINBSE, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit affirmed a federal district court's dismissal of a
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, zoo6).
92 Id. at * i (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1238 (2oo6)).
93 Id. at* 1-z.
94 Id. at *2.
95 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., PC. v.
Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449-50 (2003), whether partners are classified as employees or employ-
ers would depend upon the right to control as elucidated by the EEOC's six factor test. See
discussion supra note 43; Stephanie M. Greene & Christine Neylon O'Brien, Partners and
Shareholders as Covered Employees Under Federal Antidiscrimination Acts, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 781,
825 (2003) (discussing criteria for determining partners as employees and Clackamas decision);
Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O'Brien, Who Counts?: The United States Supreme Court
Cites 'Control' as the Key to Distinguishing Employers from Employees under Federal Employment
Antidiscrimination Laws, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 761, 787-92 (2003) (discussing when part-
ners may be employees).
96 King v. Enter. Leasing Co. of DFW, No. 3:0 5 -CV-0026-D, 2006 WL 784885 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 28, 2006).
97 Id. at* i.
98 Id. The "employer" issue in King was somewhat different from Arbaugh because it did
not involve the number of employees. Id.
99 Id. at *2. This does not mean that King will win her case, for as the court noted, the
defendants could still obtain summary judgment or defeat King's claims at trial. Id. at *5.
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Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) case.'0 0 The plaintiff there sought fed-
eral-question jurisdiction for what was essentially a violation of a collective
bargaining agreement.' The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case, but its rationale
in doing so was different, hinging on the distinction between matters of
subject-matter jurisdiction and the elements or merits of a plaintiff's claim
that were outlined by the Supreme Court in Arbaugh.'0 2 Although the plain-
tiff Fernandez still lost her case, her right to be heard in federal court on
the part of her claim arguably covered by a federal statute was upheld. The
appellate court in Fernandez agreed with the plaintiff's argument that the
dismissal should not be based upon Rule 12(b)(1) subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. Instead, the court converted the dismissal to a summary judgment for
the defendant employer under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1"3 The
court of appeals noted that the plaintiff's claim was one that arose "un-
der the laws of the United States and [wa]s neither 'immaterial and made
solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction' nor 'wholly insubstantial
and frivolous."104
[Flailure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits
and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states
a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law...
it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction
over the controversy.
05
The appellate court indicated that the district court should have grant-
ed the motion for summary judgment, a motion that would have reflected
the failure on the merits rather than on jurisdiction. In reaching its conclu-
sion, the court cited the Supreme Court's holding in Arbaugh that unless
Congress specifies that a limitation on statutory coverage is jurisdictional,
it should be treated as "an element of a plaintiff's claim for relief."'
10 6
ioo Fernandez v. Centerplat/NBSE, 44F1 3d ioo6, 1007 (D.C. Cir. zoo6).
ioi Id.
1o2 Id. at 1007, 1oo9 (citingArbaugh v.Y& H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2006)).
103 Id. at 1oo9-Io (citing Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1244 n. to).
104 Id. at ioo9 (quoting EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 E3 d 621, 623
(D.C. Cir. 1997)).
105 Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
io6 Id. (citing Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1245). The appellate court in Fernandez addressed
the plaintiff's claim that FLSA provides "federal question jurisdiction to review [an employ-
er's] alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 1oo8. On this question, the
court found that since FLSA does not contain a provision authorizing enforcement of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, and no FLSA violation occurred, Fernandez's dispute regarding
the enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement "must be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction." Id. at ioo8-io. The plaintiff strove to show that the employer had not
paid her time and one-half for hours worked in excess of eight per day under the umbrella
of an FLSA claim in order to pursue the matter in federal district court. As the circuit court
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3. Exhaustion Requirements.-Several federal district court cases have dis-
cussed the Supreme Court's decision in Arbaugh with respect to statutory
requirements that a plaintiff timely exhaust his or her administrative agen-
cy remedies before proceeding to federal court. Two such cases arose in the
federal district court in Maryland. The first, Walton v. Guidant Sales Corp.,
was brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).1"7 In
Walton, the plaintiff sought to bring his claim in federal district court de-
spite his tardy filing of an EEOC claim. The court noted that the plaintiff
failed to exhaust his administrative agency remedies because he failed to
file a formal charge within 300 days of his termination.0 8 Despite the plain-
tiff's argument that he thought he had filed a charge within the time limit
such that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled, the district
court found that the filing of a sworn charge with the EEOC is a manda-
tory prerequisite to the validity of the charge, and the evidence presented
regarding his interaction with the EEOC did not give rise to equitable toll-
ing of the deadline.'0 9 Walton's case was dismissed, but in its decision, the
court stated that exhaustion is not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction;
rather, it is a question of law that the judge must decide." 0 The district
court wrote that in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Arbaugh,
where "the employee-numerosity requirement of Title VII [was deemed
to be] an ingredient of the plaintiff's claim and not a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite," the practice of characterizing the failure to exhaust as a failure of
subject-matter jurisdiction is called into question."' As the district court
noted, the characterization of the exhaustion issue is important because if
it were cast as a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, then every federal
judge "would be required to inquire sua sponte into whether every employ-
ment discrimination plaintiff filed a timely administrative charge."'
noted, however, FLSA merely requires that a covered employee receive time and one-half for
hours worked in excess of forty hours in a calendar week. It was undisputed that the employer
had complied with the statutory requirement of overtime for work in excess of forty hours per
week. The plaintiff adopted a bootstrap approach, arguing that because the employer violated
the collective bargaining agreement with her union regarding overtime pay for work in excess
of eight hours per day, it also violated the FLSA. Id. at 1007. She relied upon language in a
Department of Labor regulation that she asserted "brought unpaid overtime compensation
for hours worked in excess of a daily rate . . . under the coverage of the FLSA." Id. at ioo8
n.i. The circuit court noted that the relevant language of the regulation simply indicated that
FLSA did not relieve an employer of contract obligations, but found that this did not provide
a basis for using FLSA to enforce the contract. Id.
107 Walton v. Guidant Sales Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d 719 (D. Md.), aff'd, No. o6-1351, 2006
WL 2974337 (4th Cir. Oct. 17, 2oo6).
io8 Id. at 720, 723-24.
109 Id. at 724.
i1o Id. at 721 n.2.
i i Id. (citing Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1245).
I1Z Walton, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 721 n.2.
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Another exhaustion case, Brown v. McKesson Bioservices Corp., involved
various claims including retaliation brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.113 The plaintiff acted pro se when filing complaints with
the state human rights commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and the state unemployment commission. 1 4 In addressing
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment in the case, the district court
cited the Supreme Court's decision in Arbaugh, and indicated that the in-
stant court's previous treatment of motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies as governed by Rule 12(b)(1) "might be incor-
rect."' 5 The district court elaborated on the proper procedural treatment,
namely that where a motion regards an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction,
the proper motion is governed by Rule 12(b)(1) "and a court can consider
matters outside of the pleadings in its analysis."'1 6 In contrast, on issues
characterized as "a failure to state a claim, a court may consider only the
pleadings unless it converts the motion to one for summary judgment.""' 7
V. CONCLUSION
The Arbaugh Court established a bright-line rule to classify what are mat-
ters of subject-matter jurisdiction and what are not. The Court seemed
compelled to draw a bright line, at least in part because of the significant
consequences of classifying an element as one of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, but also because the rule would generally impact the jurisdiction of the
federal courts in all types of cases, not just those pertaining to employment
discrimination. The Court in Arbaugh held that the employee-numerosity
threshold in Title VII, and implicitly in other employment discrimination
statutes, is not a provision that must be met for the federal courts to have
subject-matter jurisdiction in a case because Congress did not explicitly
make it so. Nonetheless, the legislature is free to amend the statutes to
make such thresholds a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction in the future.
113 Brown v. McKesson Bioservices Corp., No. Civ.A. KDC2005-o73o, 2006 WL 616021,
at 1-2 (D. Md. Mar. 1o, 2oo6).
114 Id.
I 15 Id. at *3 (citing Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. 1235).
I 16 Brown, 2oo6 WL 616OZl, at *3.
Ii7 Id.
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